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In High Gear: A Case Study of the Hees-Edper Corporate Group
Abstract
This study compares firms in the Hees-Edper Group with a number of other independent firms of similar size
and in the same industries over a four-year period from 1988 to 1992, just prior to the first release of news that
the Hees-Edper group was in financial trouble. During that period, HeesEdper firms recorded profitability
levels comparable to (or below) those of the matched firms. The Hees-Edper firms were also shown to have
been much higher risk investments well before the group's financial position began to deteriorate. They were
more highly levered, but even after risk levels are adjusted for this, the risk levels of Hees-Edper firms remain
much higher.
Our study shows that the extreme incentive-based compensation schemes used by Hees-Edper firms
encouraged managers to adopt high-risk strategies, and that the intercorporate co-insurance (allowed by the
interlocking ownership structure of the firms) made this possible by increasing the group's apparent debt
capacity. Since this higher risk did not improve overall performance, it was arguably at an economically
inefficient higher level. The higher leverage of Hees-Edper companies should have produced a sizable tax
advantage because of the deductibility of interest at the corporate level. The mediocre performance of the
companies thus raises the possibility that abnormally poor performance was masked by tax breaks.
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In High Gear: A Case Study of the
Hees--Edper Corporate Group
INTRODUCTION
THIS STUDY COMPARES FIRMS IN THE HEES-EDPER GROUP with a number ofother independent firms of similar size and in the same industries over a
four-year period from 1988 to 1992, just prior to the first release of news that
the Hees-Edper group was in financial trouble. During that period, Hees-
Edper firms recorded profitability levels comparable to (or below) those of the
matched firms. The Hees-Edper firms were also shown to have been much
higher risk investments well before the group's financial position began to dete-
riorate. They were more highly levered, but even after risk levels are adjusted
for this, the risk levels of Hees-Edper firms remain much higher.
Our study shows that the extreme incentive-based compensation
schemes used by Hees-Edper firms encouraged managers to adopt high-risk
strategies, and that the intercorporate co-insurance (allowed by the interlock-
ing ownership structure of the firms) made this possible by increasing the group's
apparent debt capacity. Since this higher risk did not improve overall perfor-
mance, it was arguably at an economically inefficient higher level. The higher
leverage of Hees-Edper companies should have produced a sizable tax advan-
tage because of the deductibility of interest at the corporate level. The
mediocre performance of the companies thus raises the possibility that abnor-
mally poor performance was masked by tax breaks.
THE ECONOMICS OF CONGLOMERATES
DURING THE 1960s AND 1970s CONGLOMERATES WERE "the glamour invest-ment on the stock market" (Firth, 1980) and financial markets reacted to
the news of diversifying acquisitions by sending stock prices of acquiring firms
skyward (Matsusaki, 1993). The resulting mob psychology infected managers
and investors alike, and diversifying acquisitions did enormous damage to
many firms that would otherwise have remained healthy and prosperous.
Eventually, the corporate world realized the diversification was excessive and
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there was a return to "core" lines of business. Today, the conglomerate merger
wave of the 1960s seems like a mania.
IN DEFENCE OF CONGLOMERATES
ARE THESE JUDGEMENTS PRECIPITOUS? There are arguments in favour of
conglomerates that make economic sense. Indeed, some of them are reasonably
persuasive, at least superficially.
First, Caves (1982) and Rugman (1994) argue that certain intangible
assets have higher returns when used on a larger scale. These are thought to
include R&D, marketing expertise, and good management. The intuition is
that a new product or advertising campaign has fixed up-front costs, but its
return depends on the size of the operation to which it is applied. Similarly, a
good manager in charge of a large operation generates more wealth than the
same good manager in charge of a small operation. The implication is that
good managers should be put in charge of operations that are as large in scope
and scale as possible.
These arguments are a widely accepted justification for international
horizontal expansion, but they also appear to have some applicability to
domestic firms. Montgomery & Wernerfelt (1988) and Panzar & Willig
(1981) utilize them analogously to explain why the wave of corporate diversi-
fication made by conglomerates in the '60s and '70s make sense.
Second, to some extent a conglomerate structure is a substitute for capital
markets. If capital markets were hopelessly myopic or otherwise grossly inef-
ficient, it would make sense to circumvent them. However, most of the
academic work on this issue suggests that markets are not that inefficient and
those, including Keynes (1933), who do argue for such a degree of inefficiency
also argue frequently that corporate managers are afflicted by the same mood
swings that affect investors. Nonetheless, even in an economy with efficient
capital markets, there are reasons to circumvent them. Two such reasons (that
also dovetail into an argument in support of conglomerates) are the "lemon"
problem and the "free-cash" problem.
The lemon problem is characterized by a firm that has good investment
projects but no spare cash; it must therefore raise funds by issuing securities.
Myers & Majluf (1984) point out that this is not costless. Firms should issue
new shares when their outstanding shares are overpriced. Securities, like used
cars, are difficult to value, and buyers are always inclined to suspect that there
is something wrong with the product - otherwise, (they ask) why is it for sale
now? Is it a lemon? Investors might rationally view the news of a new securi-
ties issues as a signal that outstanding securities are overvalued. In fact, share
prices do tend to fall when firms announce they are issuing more shares. Lesser
analogous effects are also observed for bond issues. This lemon problem in capi-
tal markets means that firms should use a "pecking order" approach when
financing new projects - that is, they should use funds obtained from internal
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cash flow whenever possible, and raise external capital only when internal
funds are not available and when the benefits of the new project outweigh the
cost of depressing the prices of the firm's outstanding securities. By transferring
funds between divisions, a conglomerate structure side-steps the lemon problem;
it can act like a financial intermediary in the sense of Diamond (1991).
Jensen (1986) argues that firms in stable, low-growth industries often
invest in money-losing projects. The free-cash problem is characterized by a
firm in a low-growth industry with no profitable investment projects; it should
payout its free cash to shareholders as dividends. But, retaining funds within
the firm often serves managers in other ways; it enables firms to expand and
thus to build up the size of managers' empires and/or it allows for labour peace
or it cements ties with politicians. Such "over-investment" by cash cows is
called the free-cash problem. Conglomerates that span both low-growth cash-
rich industries and high-growth cash-starved industries neatly solve both the
free-cash problem and the lemon problem in one easy step. A conglomerate
can invest internal funds in the best of all its divisions' projects, and thus better
serve shareholders.
Third, diversification reduces risk at the corporate level (Gahlon &
Stover, 1979). Financial academics never tire of arguing that diversification
brings no benefits to shareholders because shareholders could achieve the
same risk reduction by holding a more diversified portfolio themselves. This
argument is suspect because it assumes that diversification at the corporate
level and at the individual investor's portfolio level are perfect substitutes.
They are not. Reducing risk at the corporate level might allow for more
credible long-term commitments to workers, suppliers and customers. It might
also reduce the need to forego a return on part of the firm's capital in order to
maintain the financial slack necessary to insure liquidity. Lower level corporate
risk might also attract better workers and managers at lower wages, since a risk
premium need not accompany any investment in firm-specific skills (Aron,
1988). It might also encourage managers to undertake more risky corporate
investments than their innate aversion to risk would otherwise preclude,
thereby encouraging a greater alignment of managers' interests with those of
shareholders. Diversification at the corporate level may well not benefit share-
holders, but the case is not as open-and-shut as many believe.
Fourth, diversification reduces corporate taxes by making a more highly
levered capital structure optimal. By insuring each other through intercorporate
transfers of earnings, the divisions of a conglomerate each lower the other's
probability of defaulting on its debt relative to that of a free-standing one-
industry firm. This makes a higher over-all leverage more feasible for a
conglomerate than for a portfolio of independent one-industry firms. Of
course, if the firm elects to lever up in order to take advantage of the co-insurance
to increase its debt-related tax deductions, the risk reduction that corporate
diversification can provide is limited. The benefits of lower corporate taxes to
investors as a whole are mitigated by the higher personal taxes on debt, but in
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a world where tax-free investors - like pension funds - are playing an ever
greater role, it is not clear that there would be a wash in securities prices in
general. Moreover, shareholders are paying for bailouts they would otherwise
walk away from because of the limited liability granted the owners of stock.
The size of this reduction in dividends, in the absence of tax gains, would
exactly compensate for the better terms the firm could get from creditors and
it would be a wash. The tax deductibility of interest, but not dividends, shifts
the balance in favour of diversification.
THE FAILURE OF THE CONGLOMERATE FORM
T HE POOR PERFORMANCE OF CONGLOMERATES casts doubt on the universalvalidity of the arguments noted above. Berger & Ofek (1995) find a 13
percent to 15 percent discount in the values of conglomerates relative to
comparable portfolios of stand-alone firms. Comment & Jarrell (1995) find a
positive link between firm focus increases and stock returns. John & Ofek
(1995) find that asset sales improve firm performance when they also increase
the firm's focus. In the 1980s, firms that announced acquisitions in their own
lines of business saw their stock prices rise, while those that announced
takeovers in other industries saw their stock prices decline (Morck et al.,
1990). Wernerfelt & Montgomery (1988) find a "positive focus effect" in an
empirical study of the determinants of firms' values. Many firms that diversi-
fied aggressively in earlier years spent the 1980s shedding unrelated operations
and re-establishing their commitments to core businesses (Donaldson, 1990).
WHY DID CONGLOMERATES FALL SO FAR OUT OF FAVOUR?
FIRST, THE IDEA THAT CONGLOMERATES COULD EXPLOIT the intangible assets of
their component firms on a large(r) scale was always more strained than the
analogous theory justifying multinationals. Arguably, R&D and marketing
skills are considerably less transferable to operations in unrelated industries
than they are to operations in the same industry but in another country. Thus,
attention was centred on management skills as the intangible asset that would
increase the values of all the assets combined with the conglomerate.
Conglomerates, it was believed, had "... dynamic, entrepreneurial manage-
ment ... [which were] injected into firms which were taken over, [and] greatly
increased efficiency and profits ... which would be reflected in higher share
price performance" (Firth, 1980). Management skills are now viewed as much
less portable; today, managers who are acknowledged experts at finding oil are
not as likely to be considered to have an advantage in running a brewery too.
Moreover, even good managers can be guilty of hubris.
Second, conglomerates were seen as being plagued by corporate gover-
nance problems. They were over-centralized (Baker, 1992). Many degenerated
into little more than exercises in empire-building. Shareholders who would
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have had considerably more influence and better information about the financial
decisions being made in smaller, one-industry firms were unable to monitor or
discipline the managers of large complex conglomerates who had more oppor-
tunity to run amok. Amihud & Lev (1981) find that manager-run firms are
much more likely to establish diversified conglomerate structures than owner-
run firms; they argue that conglomerates themselves may be a manifestation of
corporate governance problems. 1 Certainly, the reduced risk in a conglomerate
should be attractive to managers. Rose & Shepard (1994) find that salaries of
managers of conglomerates are 10 percent to 12 percent higher and total
compensation is 13 percent to 17 percent greater than that of their peers in
otherwise comparable one-industry firms of similar size. However, they also
find that this premium is not related to tenure and argue that this implies it
might be due to the fact that a higher level of skill may be required to manage
a conglomerate.
Although the gains to be made through better use of internal funds,
lower corporate risk, and higher debt capacity may be real, it appears they are
largely swamped by the corporate governance problems that emerge in
conglomerates.
AN AMALGAM OF CONGLOMERATES AND FREE,STANDING FIRMS?
DESPITE THESE FINDINGS, CONGLOMERATES MIGHT STILL be a valid corporate
form, useful in some circumstances. Roe (1994) makes the case that the failure
of the U.S. conglomerate, despite its potential advantages, was due (in part) to
the fact that in conglomerates owning 100 percent of their subsidiaries,
managers were deprived of market signals that provided valuable feedback to
managers in free-standing companies. Instead, conglomerate managers
received feedback through a command-and-control system based mainly on
accounting information. Roe goes on to say that "an amalgam of partial control,
market signalling and partial integration of finance and industry (or of different
levels of Industry)" might have been superior to both the conglomerate form
and the market-disciplined free-standing firms.
However, in the United States, conglomerates with large numbers of
partially owned subsidiaries are discouraged by the Investment Company Act of
1940.1 Once 40 percent of the portfolio of a U.S. conglomerate is devoted to the
partial ownership of other firms, the company is presumed to be an investment
company and must therefore pay taxes on dividends it receives from its partially
owned subsidiaries. Since one of the main reasons underlying the existence of a
conglomerate is its ability to reallocate capital efficiently, this is a serious barrier.
The only escape is for the conglomerate to become a mutual fund, but this
entails restrictions on portfolio composition and on intercompany dealings.
In Canada, the federal Investment Companies Act) does not constitute a
barrier to conglomerate formulation comparable to that posed by the U.S.
legislation. This act requires federally incorporated companies that use debt
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capital to finance equity or debt investments to comply with certain reporting
obligations (administered by the Office of Superintendent of Financial
Institutions - the regulator of federal financial institutions). The Act also
requires companies to comply with restrictions on sundry related-party trans-
actions. The embrace of this statute can be easily avoided through provincial
incorporation or reincorporation, because there are no comparable legislative
schemes in the provinces.
Federal tax legislation has a more important regulatory influence on the
structure and performance of Canadian conglomerates. In contrast to the
United States, Canada permits tax-free dividends to be paid within a corporate
group, thereby permitting internal capital transfers to be effected on a more
tax-efficient basis. However, the comparative benefits of this difference in
dividend treatment should not be overstated. In contrast to the scope permitted
by consolidated reporting of conglomerate earnings in the United States, the
Canadian tax statute does not allow consolidation. Presumably, this makes it
more difficult for Canadian conglomerates to maximize the tax-avoidance
value of losses incurred by member corporations. The more liberal availability
of the deduction for interest payments in Canada further complicates matters,
particularly in respect of debt incurred on foreign assets. Interest deductibility
provides an implicit subsidy for debt, and this encourages corporate managers
to use high levels of debt to finance asset acquisitions. Thus, in tandem, a
cursory review of tax legislation in Canada and the United States does not
supply unequivocal evidence that the size and durability of the Canadian
conglomerate is necessarily related to differential taxation standards. Which
effects dominate is an empirical question.
Looking beyond tax policy, however, there is a range of distinctive
regulatory policies in Canada that, while not providing targeted incentives for
conglomerate formation, create scope for Canadian controlling shareholders
and their appointed managers to engage in opportunistic behaviour via the
conglomerate vehicle. For instance, it is arguable, generally, that the commit-
ment of successive Canadian governments to mercantalist industrial policies
has reduced the bargaining power of Canadian shareholders who invest(ed) in
securities of Canadian corporations. The foreign-property rule of the Income
Tax Act is an example. This rule caps the permissible level of tax favoured
retirement investments at 20 percent of the value of the portfolio (10 percent
until recently). Thus, Canadian investors have fewer alternative investments
to choose from when they wish to move their money because they disagree
with the policies of corporate managers. This may have allowed inefficient
conglomerate holding structures to survive, and may also have prolonged
wealth-reducing redistribution from investors to Canadian corporate insiders.4
The same arguments can be made in the context of Canadian corporate
and securities law. Here it is arguable that the lack of a vigorous, privately
enforced securities disclosure regime in Canada reduces the transparency of
internal corporate transactions to external shareholders and heightens the
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attractiveness of the conglomerate form of organization to opportunistic
corporate insiders_s Similarly, the lack of a clearly articulated corporate law
fiduciary duty from majority to minority shareholders in Canada is also significant
- at least historically - in explaining the attraction of conglomerates to oppor-
tunistic managers and shareholders (Daniels & MacIntosh, 1991). In the
absence of legislated fiduciary duties, controlling shareholders in Canada and
their appointed management enjoy much greater scope for unfair self-dealing
transactions than if their companies were incorporated in the United States.6
We also believe that the mercantalist industrial policies adopted by
successive Canadian governments encouraged conglomerate formation. High
levels of external trade protection, restrictions on the export of domestic capital,
and favourable tax treatment of certain types of domestic equity investment
all contributed to an inward-looking industrial economy in which Canadian
corporations focused on producing a broad range of goods and services for the
protected Canadian market rather than on a narrow range of competitive
products for the international market. In this setting, the diversified conglom-
erate served as a natural vehicle to achieve corporate growth.
In sharp contrast to the United States, in Canada a more congenial
political environment for the concentration of economic power provided
further support for the formation of conglomerates. Whereas American political
traditions have coalesced around a deep and abiding mistrust of concentrated
economic power, the Canadian political environment has been much more
sanguine. In Canada, the development and preservation of a fragile national
identity easily outweighs concerns over the concentration of corporate power.
So, to the extent that economic concentration is the inexorable result of state
protectionism, Canadians regard this as a price worth paying to promote
collectivist goals (Benidickson, 1993).
A respectable case can be made, therefore, that Canadian laws and
customs do encourage just the sort of amalgam Roe (1994) visualizes. The
largest example of corporate concentration in recent years is the Hees-Edper
group, controlled by Edward and Peter Bronfman, to which we now turn.
THE HEES~EDPERGROUP
IN 1952 SAM BRONFMAN, THE ENTREPRENEUR WHO BUILT Seagram's into a
liquor empire during Prohibition in the United States, informed his nephews,
Edward and Peter, that, while his sons would inherit the family business, a trust
would be established to provide for them. By the early 1990s, with the help of
South African financial strategist Jack Cockwell and ignoring the trend against
diversification, that trust - the brothers' nest egg - had grown into a corporate
empire of more than 100 companies spanning industries from merchant banking
to forestry. At its apex, the group of Bronfman companies made up 15 percent of
the total capitalization of the Toronto Stock Exchange. When it was eventually
liquidated the trust yielded more than C$ 100 million in Seagram's stock.
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Cockwell's strategy was based on pyramids of control. A privately held
company would own a controlling stake in a firm that would hold a control-
ling stake in another firm that would hold a controlling stake in yet another
firm, and so on. Using this strategy, control could be leveraged. The
Bronfmans could fully control a firm in which they held only 51 percent of 51
percent of ... of 51 percent of the stock. By crossing the layers of the pyramid
and liberally using restricted-voting or non-voting shares for outsiders and
super-voting shares for Bronfman insiders, the equity stakes needed to exert
control were further reduced.
This pyramid ownership structure meant that publicly traded rumps of
stock existed throughout the group. Thus, the group's organizational structure
was an amalgam of a conglomerate (with decisions coordinated by the central,
privately held companies) and public ownership (With traded stock, share-
holder meetings, boards of directors, financial statements, and institutional
ownership) .
A number of the Hees-Edper companies were added to the group via
workouts organized by the brothers' merchant bank, Hees International
Bancorp Inc. A typical example was the takeover by Hees of Versatile
Corporation in May 1987. Versatile, a farm equipment maker, had expanded
into the energy sector, and then into ship building through the purchase of
Davie in 1985. By 1987 the firm was bankrupt and Hees assumed control in a
workout, eventually holding an equity stake of over 40 percent. Another
example is the 1989 workout of National Business Systems, in which Hees
bought $80 million of the failed firm's debt from U.S. institutional investors
and assumed control. Critics may now refer to this as "vulture capital", but
Hees was arguably acquiring an expertise in organizing the affairs of troubled
firms. This falls into the category of special management skills similar to those
claimed for the managers of U.S. conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s.
In other cases, the Hees-Edper group expanded by acquiring major
players in specific industries, such as Noranda Forests and MacMillan Bloedel.
The group's real estate firms, Carena Development and Bramalea, the energy
firm Norcen, and the publishing company Pagurian, all played dominant roles
in their respective industries throughout the 1980s.
Another feature of the Hees-Edper group that deserves comment is its
practice of using exaggerated incentive-based compensation schemes to pay
managers and (in some cases) employees. Top managers received salaries that
were low by industry standards, often in the neighbourhood of only $100,000
per year, but were allowed (and expected) to borrow up to ten times their
annual salary from the group - interest free - to buy stock in its member firms. 7
However, based on anecdotal information describing the compensation
arrangements used in one group firm, Royal Trust, it appears that there was
asymmetric sharing of risk and return by management and shareholders;
implicit promises were allegedly made to key managers that they would be
protected from any downside losses resulting from leveraged equity investments,
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but that they would retain all upside gains. This system was in place for the
better part of a decade. Certainly, these arrangements provided strong incen-
tives for conglomerate managers to take risks. However, the existence of
incentive-based compensation does not in itself mean that agency problems in
the design of these schemes were obviated.
How did the Hees-Edper group take advantage of its hybrid structure? Did
it reduce risk by setting up a network of co-insurance between group firms? Or
did it use this co-insurance to lever up to a higher debt level and convert the risk
reduction into a tax advantage? Did the publicly traded rumps of stock lead to
better corporate governance than would have been the case in a pure con-
glomerate? We now turn to these issues by comparing various financial measures
for Hees-Edper group firms with those for comparable independent firms.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES IN THE HEES-EDPER GROUP were identified eachyear using Statistics Canada's Directory of Intercorporate Ownership. The
period from 1988 through 1991 was selected because these years saw the
group's largest extent. The sample period begins with 1988 to avoid including
the October 1987 crash in the data; the end of the sample period just predates
the real estate problems that triggered the decline of the Bronfman group.
Total debt and total assets were taken from the CD-ROM Canadian
Compustat. Daily stock returns were taken from the TSE-Western CD-ROM.
Companies are classified by industry using three- and four-digit standard
industrial classification (SIC) codes. Size is measured using 1990 total assets.
Each Bronfman company is matched with an independent control
company in the same industry and of roughly the same size. However, because
of the lack of suitable control companies (i.e., companies that are not member
firms of other corporate groups such as the Reichmann brothers' Olympia and
York), most large real estate companies and some financial firms had to be
dropped from the study. This left 19 companies spanning four years - a total of
76 firm-year observations. Six firm-year observations were deleted as outliers,
defined as having beta (8) or variance estimates more than three standard
errors from the mean estimates for that company or its control match, or
having a debt-to-assets ratio greater than one. This left 70 firm-year observa-
tions. The distribution of the data over time is as follows: 19 observations in
1988, 19 in 1989, 17 in 1990 and 15 in 1991.
FINDINGS
THE MAIN RESULTS ARE DISPLAYED IN TABLE 1. Tables 2 through 5 containstatistical test results that determine the reliability of the differences
between the results obtained for the Hees-Edper firms and those obtained for
the control firms shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
UNIVARIATE STATISTICS FOR ALL VARIABLES FOR ALL FIRM-YEARS STUDIED
STANDARD
Row VARIABLE SAMPLE MEAN MEDIAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM DEVIATION
I) Operating Edper Firms 7.1 8.7 -95.0 22.5 14.7
2) Income/Assets (%) Control Firms 7.7 9.5 -49.7 25.7 9.9
3) Levered Equity Edper Finns 0.694 0.645 -0.22 2.03 0.454
4) Beta Control Finns 0.303 0.043 -0.048 1.35 0.402
5) Leverage (%) Edper Firms 33.1 32.6 0 70.8 17.2
6) Control Finns 26.3 18.5 0 95.1 24.6
7) Unlevered Asset Edper Firms 0.473 0.436 -0.129 1.74 0.337
8) Beta Control Firms 0.215 0.025 -0.005 1.07 0.293
Note: Sample size is 70 Bronfman firm~years and 70 control firm~years. except for operating income, where data
are only available for 65 firm-year pairs.
Rows 1) and 2) of Table 1 give a measure of overall corporate profitability,
operating income-per-dollar of assets, expressed as a percentage return. Hees-
Edper firms have slightly worse performance by this measure than do comparable
independent firms. However, these differences are not sufficiently clear-cut to
pass the statistical tests shown in Table 2. Analogous tests using other accounting-
performance ratios yield similar results. We conclude that Hees-Edper firms did
not perform better than comparable independent firms. Their performance
was, at best, comparable to that of the matched control firms.
Rows 3) and 4) of Table 1 compare levered equity 5s for the two groups
of firms. A firm's 5 is a standard measure of risk used by portfolio managers.s
A high 5 indicates a high-risk investment, while a low 5 indicates a relatively
safe investment. The 5s for Bronfman firms are substantially higher than those
of the control firms. Table 3 shows that these differences are statistically highly
significant. We conclude that the stock of Bronfman firms is much riskier than
that of comparable independent firms.
Rows 5) and 6) of Table 1 compare the leverage of Hees-Edper firms
with those of the matched control firms. Bronfman firms have much higher
financial leverage than comparable independent firms, and Table 4 shows
that this difference is statistically highly significant. We conclude that
Bronfman firms have taken on much higher debt loads than comparable
independent firms.
Rows 7) and 8) of Table 1 show a comparison of unlevered 5s. Unlevered
asset 5s are theoretical 5s that companies would have if they had no debt.9
This risk measure is used by financial economists as a measure of the underlying
risk in the firm's operations. Even after making this adjustment, Hees-Edper
companies continue to have higher risk levels than the control firms. We
conclude that the higher risk of the Bronfman companies is not due solely to
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TABLE 2
STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING OPERATING INCOME PER DOLLAR OF ASSETS OF
BRONFMAN FIRMS (DEBT/AsSETS) TO THAT OF MATCHED CONTROL FIRMS
MEAN MEDIAN
Bronfman Companies (%) 7.11 8.72
Industry/Size-Match Companies (%) 7.74 9.48
Difference between Bronfman
and Matching Companies (%) 0.63 0.100
p-VaIue for Differences (t-Test for Means,
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Medians) 0.468 0.811
Number of Observations (Firm Years) 65 65
TABLE 3
STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING LEVERED EQUITY BETAS OF BRONFMAN FIRMS WITH
THOSE OF MATCHED CONTROL FIRMS
MEAN MEDIAN
Bronfman Companies 0.694 0.645
Industry/Size-Match Companies 0.303 0.043
Difference between Bronfman
and Matching Companies 0.391 0.360
p-VaIue for Differences (t-Test for Means,
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Medians) 0.0001 0.0001
p-Value for Weighted t-Test 0.0001
Number of Observations (Firm Years) 70 70
high debt loads. The underlying business operations of the Hees-Edper firms
appear to entail more risk than other Canadian companies of similar size in
the same industries_ They have higher operating leverage as well as higher
financial leverage.
Missing from Table 1 are stock market performance measures. A proper
analysis of stock price performance is complicated for firms like the Hees-Edper
group. Their involved and interlocking ownership structure with multiple classes
of differential voting stock, some privately held, make it difficult to apply the
standard tools of firm valuation and stock return measurement. We are pursuing
further research in this area, examining a broader range of performance
measures, including some that are market-value based.
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TABLE 4
STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING LEVERAGE IN BRONFMAN FIRMS (DEBT/AsSETS) TO
LEVERAGE IN MATCHED CONTROL FIRMS
MEAN MEDIAN
Bronfman Companies (0/0) 33.1 32.6
Industry/Size-Match Companies (0/0) 26.3 18.5
Difference between Bronfman
and Matching Companies (0/0) 6.8 6.6
p-Value for Differences (t-Test for Means,
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Medians) .0033 .0009
Number of Observations (Finn Years) 70 70
TABLE 5
STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING UNLEVERED ASSET BETAS OF BRONFMAN FIRMS
WITH THOSE OF MATCHED CONTROL FIRMS
MEAN MEDIAN
Bronfman Companies .473 .436
Industry/Size-Match Companies .215 .025
Difference between Bronfman
and Matching Companies .259 .261
p-Value for Differences (t-Test for Means,
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for Medians) .0001 .0001
p-Value for Weighted t-Test .0001
Number of Observations (Finn Years) 70 70
CONCLUSIONS
OUR OVERALL RESULTS SUPPORT THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS. First, ourdata show no clearly superior performance in terms of average return on
assets for Hees-Edper firms over comparable independent firms. This suggests
that the conglomerate structure did not improve overall economic efficiency
by enabling member firms to exploit each other's intangible assets and thereby
achieve new synergies. For example, employing superior management techniques
developed at one firm to invigorate another should have produced higher
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performance. Therefore Canadian public policy that directly or indirectly
encourages the formation of conglomerates cannot be justified on the grounds
of increased economies of scale or scope in applying such assets, at least in this
case, or if such advantages were achieved, they were offset by other negative
factors.
Second, our data do not provide evidence that the Hees-Edper group
allocated capital internally in ways superior to those accomplished by financial
markets or financial institutions. This should also have produced evidence of
better performance in group firms than in comparable independent firms. The
fact that it did not casts doubt on the benefits of centralized managerial control
over a diverse range of industries. Quite simply, senior Hees-Edper managers
failed to confer tangible economic gains on member firms through superior
capital allocation. Indeed, quite the opposite may be true. Hees-Edper manage-
ment may have used a small stable of cash cows to support earlier investments
in chronically under-performing firms. In this respect, the lack of vigorous
market pressure may have allowed the conglomerate's management system-
atically to persist in maintaining irrational and idiosyncratic commitments to
dog companies.
Third, Hees-Edper management did not use the co-insurance their
conglomerate structure allowed to reduce overall risk levels in the corporation.
Instead, they used the group's risk-sharing potential to increase overall levels
of risk beyond what would have been permitted by debt markets for comparable
independent firms. This was accomplished in part through increased financial
leverage, and in part it appears to stem from higher operating leverage, i.e.,
riskier overall business practices. To the extent that Canadian business is
hampered by excessive innate risk aversion on the part of Canadian managers,
encouraging conglomerates may have an invigorating effect.
This line of argument is valid only if the managers of the conglomerate
use the risk-sharing potential of intercorporate co-insurance to justify invest-
ments that would otherwise be regarded as too speculative. The riskier
management decisions made in the Hees-Edper group were facilitated by the
group's conglomerate structure, but they might not have occurred without the
extreme incentive-based compensation schemes Bronfman managers and
employees were given. Furthermore, high relative levels of firm risk should
have been accompanied by higher levels of relative returns if the risk-taking
was of an economically efficient sort. Perhaps the incentive-based compensation
scheme the group used actually encouraged excessive and overly speculative
risk-taking.
Fourth, Hees-Edper companies were more highly levered than comparable
independent firms, and this likely produced a tax advantage. The fact that this
is not reflected in higher earnings casts a somewhat harsher light on the
mediocre accounting performance of the firms in the group. Also, since the
higher debt in group firms was accompanied by risk-sharing, there need be no
improvement in managerial incentives of the sort Jensen (1989) envisions.
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Jensen essentially argues that an imminent threat of bankruptcy encourages
better management in highly levered firms. Thus, to the extent that the group
used the increased debt capacity created by its intercorporate risk sharing to
avoid taxes, its social benefits are more questionable.
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
How CAN PUBLIC POLICY ACCENTUATE the desirable features of corporate
groups like Hees-Edper and mitigate their undesirable features? As argued
elsewhere, vibrant and open capital and product markets are probably the
strongest antidote against the growth of seemingly perverse organizational
structures (Morck, 1995; Daniels & Halpern, 1995). With vigorous markets,
the ability of managers to devise and maintain inefficient organizational forms
is constrained. In this respect, we believe that further relaxation of the foreign
property rule, a continued liberalization of external trade barriers, and reduced
protectionism of domestic capital market suppliers are all necessary steps.
However, we believe that other policy instruments are also in order.
Nuanced reforms to securities regulations that give private investors
both the ability and the incentive to prosecute alleged breaches of disclosure
obligations would be useful, particularly at a time when resources for public
enforcement are so limited. Reforms to corporate and securities proxy rules
that impair institutional shareholders' voices (such as the shareholder commu-
nication rules that require shareholders to bear the costs of a dissident proxy
circular in the event of a disagreement with management) would also be useful
(Pound, 1991). Both of these reforms would bolster the capability of share-
holders to monitor and to intervene as required, with the result that less
reliance would be placed on the putative superiority of internal versus external
systems of capital allocation. Also, federal regulators should recognize that some
variation on section 9.1 of the Ontario Securities Commission Regulations
(which forces disclosure about intercorporate transactions in such groups) is
critically important in preventing abuse in groups like Hees-Edper. A regulation
of this nature should be a key part of any federal securities law if Ottawa asserts
its jurisdiction in that area.
Another set of reforms to securities regulation focuses on tax distortions
that implicitly favour debt over equity instruments by allowing the deduction
of interest. Removing the interest subsidy on debt would remove an incentive
to share risk across companies in a corporate group like Hees-Edper solely in
order to to reduce corporate taxes. The effect of the change would be to
reduce the desirability of strained capital structures such as those in levered
buyouts (LBOs). On the whole, such a change could also be expected to
reduce the general corporate tax rate. If it is desirable to subsidize debt because
high leverage encourages more careful management decisions (as Jensen,
1989, argues) it should be recognized that conglomerates can and do circum-
vent this. Intercorporate risk-sharing in such groups allows for higher leverage
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without a perspective-enhancing increased chance of bankruptcy. Perhaps
intercorporate dividends should therefore be taxed more vigorously, and over-
all corporate tax rates be reduced.
Finally, although more amorphous in character, we believe that changes
to the political climate in which Canadian corporations operate are appropriate.
It is perplexing that the substantial concentration of economic power that was
amassed in the Hees-Edper group received so little attention from the regulators
and the financial community. It strikes us as odd that a single group was able
to assemble control over more than 15 percent of the market capitalization of
the country's premier stock exchange with scarcely a hint of criticism by
regulators, politicians or the press. In this respect, we suggest that increased
scrutiny, more analysis and, indeed, reform of the economic and political
institutions that could accept such potentially destabilizing economic power
are in order. However, concerns about vertical equity should not be used to
thwart the creation of optimal organizational arrangements. Specifically, we
fear that deep-seated concerns about vertical equity will limit the capacity of
shareholders to devise workable incentive-based compensation arrangements that
could, in turn, spawn incentives for managers to use firm-level diversification
rather than explicit pay differentials to guard their firm-specific human capital
investments. The Hees-Edper group provides solid evidence of the ability of
strong incentive schemes to increase risk taking. It would be a pity if such
incentives were disallowed simply because of concern that successful managers
might earn too much.
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